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Abstract Despite accelerating globalization, most people
still eat food that is grown locally. Developing countries
with weak purchasing power tend to import as little food as
possible from global markets, suffering consumption
deficits during times of high prices or production declines.
Local agricultural production, therefore, is critical to both
food security and economic development among the rural
poor. The level of local agricultural production, in turn, will
be determined by the amount and quality of arable land, the
amount and quality of agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seeds,
pesticides, etc.), as well as farm-related technology,
practices and policies. This paper discusses several emerg-
ing threats to global and regional food security, including
declining yield gains that are failing to keep up with
population increases, and warming in the tropical Indian
Ocean and its impact on rainfall. If yields continue to grow
more slowly than per capita harvested area, parts of Africa,
Asia and Central and Southern America will experience
substantial declines in per capita cereal production. Global
per capita cereal production will potentially decline by 14%
between 2008 and 2030. Climate change is likely to further
affect food production, particularly in regions that have
very low yields due to lack of technology. Drought, caused
by anthropogenic warming in the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, may also reduce 21st century food availability in
some countries by disrupting moisture transports and
bringing down dry air over crop growing areas. The
impacts of these circulation changes over Asia remain
uncertain. For Africa, however, Indian Ocean warming
appears to have already reduced rainfall during the main
growing season along the eastern edge of tropical Africa,
from southern Somalia to northern parts of the Republic of
South Africa. Through a combination of quantitative
modeling of food balances and an examination of climate
change, this study presents an analysis of emerging threats
to global food security.
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Introduction
Despite accelerating globalization, food security in most of
the developing world depends upon local food production.
Most rural citizens in developing nations are involved in
agriculture (Lamb 2000). Also, most locally produced
goods are consumed locally, so increasing local productiv-
ity and slowing population growth remains a central food
security issue (Devereux and Maxwell 2001; Schmidhuber
and Tubiello 2007). Over the past few years, energy price
increases, biofuels and food scarcity have led to higher
global food prices and price volatility.1 Rapidly increasing
1 Between 2000 and 2007, increased biofuel demand contributed 30%
of the weighted average increase of global grain prices. Personal
communication, Joachim von Braun, IFPRI, October 2008.
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consumer prices limit food access. Increased price volatility
reduces the benefit that small scale farmers derive from
higher producer prices. Biofuels create competition
between poor people in the developing world and energy
consumers in the developed world. While higher priced
commodities can bring direct benefits to farmers, these
benefits will not be attained without significant and
sustained investments in agriculture to increase production
and in programs that reduce price volatility.
High and volatile food prices make local production
even more important for food insecure regions. With high
prices and continually increasing transportation costs,
producing more locally will become an important source
of vitality for programs focused on reducing poverty (FAO
2007). Connecting new innovations in crop research with
improved outcomes in the developing world will likely
require public sector investments (Delmer 2005). The
recent entry into small-scale agricultural investment by the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has added new vibrancy
to efforts focused on understanding barriers to increasing
yields and sustaining production in the face of climate
change.
This paper explores the convergence of three different
trends: changes in agricultural production, changing climate
and increasing population. Our assumption in the analyses
presented is that that some countries will continue to have
substantially less purchasing power than others over the
next few decades. Although global trade is important, we
assume that regions with small agriculturally based econ-
omies today are unlikely to transform themselves into
industrial nations without first improving their agricultural
productivity (Kates 2000; Fafchamps 2004; Haggblade
2007). The collision between increasing global food
demand, competition for food with developed world energy
consumers and increasingly difficult production conditions
means that the food security situation is likely to worsen.
Climate change will potentially bring reduced rainfall over
some regions, and increased rainfall over others. The
impact of these changes on agriculture must be anticipated
and planned for (Verhagen et al. 2004).
To this end, this paper examines potential trends in per
capita cereal production and rainfall. While other foods
make substantial contributions to diets in many areas, per
capita cereal production is indicative of general food
availability in most developing countries. If the current
rates of yield and population increases persist, many
regions will see substantial declines in cereal availability.
Greenhouse gas-induced reductions in monsoonal rainfall
could exacerbate these grain shortages. On the other hand,
relatively modest yield improvements in the least developed
nations could lead to improved levels of per capita cereal
production by 2030. If done sustainably, raising yields in
these poorest nations may be the most technologically
feasible way of addressing global cereal demands while
reducing poverty and food insecurity.
Data
This study uses five sets of data (Table 1): agricultural
statistics, population, observed rainfall and simulated
rainfall from 10 different global climate models (Table 2).
Based on simple equations describing the conservation of
mass, momentum, radiation and other key dynamic factors,
the global climate models simulate the full atmosphere at
sub-daily time steps. These models may be constrained by
observed sea surface temperatures (SSTs), or run combined
with ocean models in full simulation mode. When con-
strained by observed SSTs, the models produce circulations
resembling the observed atmosphere. This analysis uses 24
of these 20th century (1980–2000) simulations from 10
models to examine how well the models recreate observed
seasonal rainfall variations between 1980 and 2000 (repre-
sented by the Global Precipitation Climatology Project
(GPCP) rainfall observations). Our study also examines
climate change simulations for the 21st century which
predict a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations by
2100 (Meehl et al. 2007). When combined with ocean
models and forced by projected trends in greenhouse gasses
and aerosols, climate simulations can be used to examine
the impact due to anthropogenic emissions into the
atmosphere. This study examines 28 simulations from a
standard emission scenario—the Special Report on Emis-
sions Scenarios, SRESA1B. Individual simulations were
weighted in such a way as to give each model an equal
influence.
Methods
This section describes the approach taken by our regional
food balance trend analysis, analysis of climate change
scenarios and detailed analyses of Eastern African food
security projections.
Regional food balance projections
One basic tenet of our work is that food availability plays a
critical and increasing role in food security. Following the
UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization’s division of the
world into 18 regions,2 and using 1961–2007 data on total
cereal yields, harvested area and total population, one can
write a simple equation describing per capita cereal
production (c, [kg per person per year]) in terms of total
2 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm
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harvested area (a,[hectares]), total population (n, [people])
and total annual cereal yield (y, [kg per ha per year]).
c ¼ a=nð Þy ð1Þ
This is a coarse metric that clearly ignores many
important food security variables related to nutrition,
access, trade, vulnerability, pastoral livelihoods, etc. (Davis
et al. 2001; Devereux and Maxwell 2001). Nonetheless, per
capita cereal production is an important indicator of food
availability, especially in large landlocked regions with
large agrarian populations, a restriction that applies to most
of Africa, Asia, and South America. This study examines
FAO statistics averaged over very large multi-national
regions and this tends to diminish the relative impact of
cross-border trade. Another advantage of this approach is
transparency. Trends in per capita harvested area and yield
can be analyzed and their relationship to per capita
agricultural production diagnosed, revealing shifts in
agricultural production and baseline vulnerability.
Conceptually, per capita production is influenced by
negative and positive trends (Fig. 1); per capita harvested
area declines while yields increase. Since 1961, in almost
all regions of the world, the population (n) has grown
faster than the harvested area (a), so that the per capita
planted area has decreased with time. Per capita harvested
area thus represents the interaction of finite environmental
resources with an expanding population. Other related
factors, such as land degradation and soil nutrient
depletion, are likely to change with time in the same
way (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987).
Table 2 Number of 20th Centurya (1980–2000) & 21st Centuryb
(2000–2100) simulations used in this study. These model simulations
are produced by premier climate modeling groupsc in the United
States, Europe and Asia
Models 20th Century
(1980–2000)
21st Century
(2000–2100)
GFDL CM 2.1 1 2
GISS ER 4 2
IAP FGOALS 3 3
IPSL CM4 6 1
MIROC3.2 Hi Res 1 1
MIROC3.2 Med Res 3 3
MPI ECHAM5 3 3
MRI CGCM 2.3.2a 1 5
NCAR CCSM 3.0 1 7
UKMO HADGEM1 1 1
a The 20th Century simulations are based on observed sea surface
temperature and atmospheric aerosol and greenhouse gas patterns, and
have been drawn from the Atmospheric Model Intercomparison
Project (AMIP) experiment
b The 21st Century simulations are based on predicted a C02 doubling
scenario (SRESA1B) provided by the IPCC. These 21st Century
climate change simulations are drawn from the World Climate
Research Program’s Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3
(CMIP3) multi-model dataset (Meehl et al. 2007)
c Simulated 20th and 21st Century precipitation fields are drawn from
multi-model ensembles of numerical weather predictions obtained
from the Programme for Climate Model Diagnostics and Intercom-
parison. Full details about these models are available at http://www-
pcmdi.llnl.gov/projects/cmip/Table.php
Table 1 Sources of agricultural, social and climate data used in this analysis
Parameter Observed (o) Time period Source
Predicted (p)
Cereal production statisticsa o 1961–2007 Food and Agriculture Organisation
http://faostat.fao.org/
Population datab o & p 1960–2050 United Nations Population Division
http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm
Annual food aid totalsc o 1979–2005 World Food Programme
http://www.wfp.org/
Seasonal Rainfalld o 1979–2007 Global Precipitation Climatology Project
http://www.gewex.org/gpcp.html
20th and 21st Century rainfall simulations p 1950–2100 Program for Climate Model Diagnosis
and Intercomparison
http://www-pcmdi.llnl.gov/
a United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) yield, harvested area, seed and fertilizer statistics. These data have been pooled by
commodity to include all cereal crops
b United Nations World Population Division mid-level population estimates and projections
c Total country level international food aid (food shipments plus cash subsidies), obtained from the FAO database
d Combined gauge and satellite rainfall estimates, totaled over three-month seasons
e 20th and 21st climate change rainfall simulations produced by ten different global climate models
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Yield trends, on the other hand, reflect increases in
human knowledge, innovation, social and economic orga-
nization, as well as the ability and willingness to invest in
improving agricultural production (Lo and Sene 1989;
Watts 1989; Turner et al. 1993). Yield trends everywhere
in the world have been positive over the past 50 years
(Cassman et al. 2003). Together, per capita harvested area
and yield trends describe the direction of per capita cereal
production, one major determinant of food security.
Our focus is not on identifying individual food crises but
on exploring slow changes in agricultural sustainability.
Therefore, study uses 10 year averages of a/n and y for the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000–2008. Denoting
trends with over-arrows, approximate tendencies in per
capita cereal can be expressed as a function of time.
c!¼ a=nð Þ! y! ð2Þ
where ln a=nð Þ! ¼ b0 þ b1 ln Yearð Þ ð3Þ
and y!¼ b2 þ b3 Year ð4Þ
Trends in per capita cereal production are a function of
trends in per capita harvested area and yield (Eqs. 2, 3 and 4).
Since fitting linear trends to the 10 year per capita harvested
area data produced negative projections for some regions
(suggesting an impossible situation where the harvested area
was less than zero), log-linear trend functions were fitted to
the regional 10 year per capita harvested area data (Eq. 3).
Linear trends were used to model yield data (Eq. 4).
The four parameter-models described by Eqs. 2, 3 and 4
were fitted individually to 18 large multi-national regions
over the 1960s–2008 time period. At regional-decadal scales,
the individual models performed well with typical R-squared
values of 0.9. While simple, this statistical framework is able
to describe a large portion (84%) of the regional-decadal per
capita production variations and corresponds well with
observed global variations (Fig. 1). If we assume continuity
of these linear trends, we can project regional per capita
production values into the first half of the 21st century. The
analysis also highlights the fact that population, yield, and
harvested area trends tend to predominate over climate
factors in determining production variations over time.
To better understand the human impacts of shifting
relationships between population and cereal production, we
define a ‘theoretical population without food’ or p.
p ¼ ayð Þ  ngð Þ½ g1 ð5Þ
In this equation, p is the theoretical population without
food, measured in units of people, (ay) is annual cereal
production (yield times area) [kg per year], n is the number of
people and g is the annual grain requirement per person [kg
per person per year]. In practice, g varies substantially
between cultures and livelihood groups. This study assumes
a caloric requirement of 1,900 calories/day and a typical
caloric content of 3,600 calories per kilogram of grain. This
leads to an annual grain requirement, in theory, of 190 kg. This
calculation presumes a perfect distribution of grain, and no use
of cereal for biofuels, livestock, alcohol or other purpose
(Cassman 2007). On the other hand, it also ignores imports
and other sources of nutrition. While only an approximation
of food availability, Eq. 5 provides a means of estimating the
magnitude of cereal deficits and surpluses. Regions experi-
encing large cereal deficits may have theoretical food
balances with large negative values, indicating that millions
of people may experience food shortages. On the other hand,
some regions may have large grain surpluses, theoretically
able to support millions of people. It is important to note that
this calculation assumes a low baseline consumption rate.
Climate change rainfall projections
Because global climate models represent terrestrial rainfall
poorly, it is often preferable to focus on large scale climate
features that they represent well. Two such patterns are
rainfall over the central Indian Ocean (IO) and the 1st
principal component (PC1) of global seasonal precipitation.
This study describes these indicators, evaluates how they
Fig. 1 Observed (FAO data) and modeled global cereal trends in
yields and per capita harvested area averaged by decades. Modeled
global cereal yields (open circles) fit observed yields (closed circles)
very well. Similarly, modeled per per capita harvested area decreases
(open boxes) give a good fit with observed data (closed boxes).
Extrapolation of the trends are used in this paper to predict future
outcomes
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might change during the early 21st century, and uses these
changes to predict 2050 changes in mean rainfall.
The central Indian Ocean is a critical influence on drought
along the eastern seaboard of Africa (Verdin et al. 2005).
Greenhouse gas emissions have increased Indian Ocean
temperature (Funk et al. 2008); this warming disrupts
onshore moisture transport into South and East Africa,
substantially reducing main season rainfall, especially during
the 6 months between December and May. This analysis
uses seasonal March-April-May (MAM), June-July-August
(JJA), September-October-November (SON), and December-
January-February (DJF) rainfall totals averaged between 0–
15°S and 60–90°E to represent Indian Ocean warming. We
refer to this indicator as ‘IO,’ for ‘Indian Ocean’.3
Variations in the tropical Pacific Ocean also influence
global changes in precipitation. The most important time
variations of global rainfall anomalies can be summarized
by their ‘principal components’, or PCs, which are time
series designed to succinctly summarize the underlying
data. The first principal component of global rainfall (PC1)
is strongly correlated with El Niño and tropical SSTs in the
central-eastern tropical Pacific.
This study examines the IO and PC1s from a large set of
climate change simulations (Table 2). Using historical
observations, we then statistically relate variations in our
two indicators to variations in observed terrestrial rainfall.
These hybrid dynamic-statistical models rely on the climate
models to predict the changing behavior of large scale
climate features and on statistics to interpret the local
implications of these changes. Two hybrid statistical-
dynamic reformulations are presented: a global reformula-
tion (Brown and Funk 2008) and a higher resolution
analysis focused on east and South Africa. This hybrid
statistical-dynamic technique is quite distinct from the
evaluations provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC: Solomon et al. 2007). Our
statistical downscaling approach tends to identify declines
in monsoonal precipitation in Asia and East Africa, where
the IPCC simulations tend to suggest increasing rainfall.
Detailed analysis of Eastern African food aid tendencies
This section presents a more detailed discussion of food
security tendencies in Eastern and Southern Africa. Specif-
ically, we analyze Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho. This region broadly
aligns with the FAO’s ‘Eastern Africa’ region (FAO 2007).
Climatically, this collection of nations along the eastern edge
of Africa falls into two groups. The southern states
experience a single rainfall maximum during December–
February (DJF). The northern states, in the Greater Horn of
Africa, typically experience two rainfall maxima: in March–
May (MAM) and in September–November (SON). Ethiopia
and Eritrea have a maximum in June–August (JJA). We have
included Tanzania within Southern Africa because DJF is the
most agriculturally productive quarter.
The objective of the analysis is to estimate the relationship
between main season rainfall, agricultural statistics, popula-
tion figures and World Food Program food aid totals for each
of these nations over the time period 1979-present. Log-linear
empirical models of national annual cereal production were
created by regressing historical FAO production data against
main season rainfall, harvested area, and seed and fertilizer
inputs.
p ¼ b1r  b2a  b3s  b4f ð6Þ
Where r is main season rainfall expressed as a percent of
the historical mean, a is harvested area, s is input seed, and
f represents fertilizer use; p is total cereal production [kg],
and b1…4 are coefficients determined by regression between
the natural logs of p, r, a, s, and f. Seed and fertilizer values
obtained from FAO are measured in kg per year. Combin-
ing this equation with Eq. 1 allows us to separate the
primary environmental variation (rainfall) from ‘structural’
components of national per capita cereal production.
c ¼ b1r b2a  b3s  b4f  n1
  ð7Þ
In this equation c is per capita cereal production [kg per
person per year]. This equation is similar to Eq. 1, but more
explicit. The key factors determining yields (seed, fertilizer
and rainfall) are now included. This gives us a quantitative
means to assess the impacts of drought and changes in seed
and fertilizer use. We can further separate Eq. 7 into
environmental (e) and human (h) components.
c ¼ eh
where e ¼ b1r
and h ¼ b2a  b3s  b4f  n1ð Þ
ð8Þ
The environmental component includes interannual
variation in weather, plus long-term variations that may be
associated with climate change. The human component
includes a combination of population (n) and large-scale
agricultural factors (harvested area a, seed use s, and
fertilizer use f, as per capita demand based on population.
This combination of factors (h) is referred to as ‘per capita
agricultural capacity’. Typically, all of these terms tend to
trend strongly and vary less than rainfall on interannual
time scales. Thus, agricultural capacity trends tend to
dominate food security variations on 10 year time scales.
3 Please note that this indicator is distinct from the Indian Ocean
dipole, which compares sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies in
the southeastern and northwestern tropical Indian Ocean.
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Rainfall tends to vary substantially from year to year,
producing variations in production about a baseline.
For Eastern, Western, and Southern Africa, the inverse of
national per capita cereal production (i.e., a food deficit or
imbalance) is strongly related to regional, 10 year variations
in World Food Program (WFP) food aid (R2=0.87, Funk et
al. 2008). Area harvested trends, seeds, fertilizer and
population may be placed in Eq. 8 to assess the potential
impacts these tendencies have on baseline agricultural
capacity. The relative impact of changes in rainfall versus
structural elements may also be assessed using Eq. 8.
Additionally, Eq. 8 implies a potential for multiplicative
impacts in areas experiencing both drought and decreasing
per capita agricultural capacity.
Results
Global food balance analysis
Between 1961 and 1986, global total cereal yield increased
by 89%, harvested area expanded by 11% and global per
capita cereal production increased enormously, with a
maximum in about 1986 (Fig. 2). Population, meanwhile,
grew by 60% over those 25 years, resulting in an increase
in per capita cereal production from 284 to 372 kg of grain
per person per year. The last 21 years (1987–2007) have
seen slower population growth (34% increase) accompa-
nied by slower yield improvements (31% increase) and a
2% reduction in the total area harvested. Surprisingly, over
this period according to FAO and UN data, per capita
harvested area, fertilizer and seed use have all declined by
20–30% (Fig. 2). Presumably, higher yielding seeds, double
cropping of rice, irrigation and more effective farming
techniques have made up for lower per capita inputs. Per
capita production is now about 350 kg of cereal per person
per year, 6% less than the 1986 maximum.
The relative stabilization of global per capita production
hides the increased use of cereals for biofuels, alcohol and
meat production, as well as significant variations between
regions. Population growth rates vary tremendously geo-
graphically (Table 3). Four regions have more than doubled
their population since 1980: Eastern Africa, Western Africa,
Middle Africa and Western Asia. Central America, South-
ern America, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Southern
Asia, and Southeastern Asia have seen their populations
increase by more than 50%. Since 1980, two out of every
three people born now live in Asia. Another one out of four
lives in Africa.
Across most of Africa, harvested area has increased
substantially more than yields (Funk et al. 2008). In Eastern
Africa, for example, yields have only increased by 25%
since 1980, while harvested area increased by 55%. In
Western Africa yields increased by 42% while harvested
area increased by 127%. Yields, per capita harvested area
and production remain very low. Across much of the rest of
the world, harvested areas have remained fairly steady and
yields have been the primary driver of agricultural growth.
Our evaluation of FAO statistics shows that Southern
America, Northern America, Eastern, Southern and South-
eastern Asia have experienced greater than 70% increases
in yields since 1980. Today, huge regional disparities in
yields remain the norm. In 2007, cereal yields varied by
almost 600%, from ~1,000 kg ha−1 in Middle Africa, to
more than 5,000 kg ha−1 in Northern America, Eastern
Asia, and Europe.4
Given that global and regional tendencies in per capita
harvested area and yields appear fairly predictable (R2>0.8)
on 10 year scales (Fig. 1), we may plausibly use the
observed trends to project to 2030. Table 4 presents the
anticipated 2007 to 2030 changes, expressed as kg of
cereals per person per year, and as percent changes
compared to 2007. Figure 3 shows the historical and
projected per capita cereal production for selected regions.
Globally, a return to per capita production of the late 1960s,
when per capita production was near 327 kg per person,
Fig. 2 Global per capita cereal production statistics, expressed as
percentages of a 1986 baseline. Data were obtained from FAO.
Population figures are based on estimates from the United Nations.
Total cereal production divided by the Earth’s population (solid black
line) has stagnated since the mid-1980s. Since 1961, the total area
devoted to cereal farming has increased, but more slowly than
population growth leading to a fairly linear decline in per capita
harvested area (dashed line). The total amount of global seed grain
tracks closely with harvested area, and per capita seed use (grey line)
follows a similar downward linear trend. Total per capita fertilizer use
follows a parabolic trend, peaking the mid-1980s
4 Note that this study uses FAO cereal yields data. The specific
commodities will vary substantially by region.
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appears likely. Eastern Asia may return to 1980s production
levels (near 300 kg person−1) and Southern Asia to 1960s
levels (near 200 kg person−1). Declines in heavily populat-
ed Asia could re-expose millions of people to chronic
undernourishment.5 Central and Southern America may
experience 18–20% declines in per capita cereal production
levels. Eastern and Middle Africa, however, may be
affected most, with more than 30% reductions in already
low per capita cereal production levels, with Eastern Africa
changing from 131 kg per year in 2007 to 84 kg per person
per year in 2030. United Nations (UN) projections suggest
that the population of Eastern Africa will increase by 191
million people by 2030—a net increase second only to
Southern Asia.
While imprecise, it is instructive to evaluate simple food
balance equations, examining the number of people who
could be reasonably supported by the anticipated levels of
grain production (Table 4). We do this by calculating the
theoretical population without food (Eq. 5). Globally, the
2030 food balance estimates suggest that as now, we will
still have enough grain to maintain our human population,
Table 3 Relevant agricultural statistics for 2007 obtained from the
FAO. Unless international trade and aid can make up the difference,
areas with theoretical food balance deficits will face systematic food
shortages. The magnitude of these shortages can be evaluated by
looking at the food balance deficits expressed as percentages of the
total population. With some exceptions, regions with the largest
population increases over the past 27 years also have the largest per
capita food deficits
Populationa Yieldb Per capita Harvested
Areac
Per capita
Productiond
Theoretical Food
Balance [millions] e
% change in
populationf
Millions
of people
kg ha−1 ha person−1 kg person−1 millions
of people e
[%]f [%]
Regions 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 1980–2007
World 6,612 3,347 0.11 354 5,548 49
Eastern Africa 302 1,482 0.09 131 −96 −32 107
Middle Africa 116 967 0.06 62 −79 −68 113
Northern Africa 198 1,725 0.11 190 −3 −1 77
Southern Africa 54 2,466 0.07 182 −3 −6 63
Western Africa 276 1,165 0.16 189 −5 −2 107
N. America 337 5,913 0.23 1374 2,066 32
Cent. America 151 2,893 0.08 243 40 67
Caribbean 40 2,201 0.02 51 −29 −73 36
South America 385 3,704 0.09 349 314 59
Central Asia 59 1,696 0.32 541 na 11
Eastern Asia 1,541 5,418 0.06 314 967 31
Southern Asia 1,603 2,645 0.09 231 323 71
S-Eastern Asia 570 3,756 0.10 368 518 59
Western Asia 223 1,985 0.10 204 13 121
Eastern Europe 295 2,228 0.27 606 632 −18
N. Europe 96 5,149 0.09 472 140 18
S. Europe 146 4,147 0.10 416 169 6
W. Europe 187 6,419 0.09 594 389 9
Oceania 34 1,221 0.06 68 85 49
a UN population estimates for 2007
b The total FAO cereal yield for 2007 for the region
c The ratio of the total cereals harvested area and population
d Per capita production, or the ratio of the total cereal production and population
e The theoretical food balance defined by Eq. 5. This is the number of unfed people assuming a caloric cereals requirement of 190 kg per person
per year
f Food balance deficit expressed as percentages of the total population in 2007
g. The last column shows recent population increases, expressed percent of the 1980 population
5 Note that due to a short historical archive, we have not modeled
central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan). This region is likely to exhibit similar trends in food
security, potentially further exacerbated by increasing temperatures
and water scarcity.
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albeit at a low baseline value of 1,900 calories a day. This
estimate, however, does not take into account grain
consumption associated with livestock production, biofuels
or industrial applications.
Most of the production increases supporting these
surpluses may occur in Eastern and Southern Asia and
Northern America, where our modeling suggests 47% and
28% of new production will occur as a consequence of 25
to 35% increases in yields. Our projected yields in Eastern
Asia and Northern America reach 7,500 kg ha−1. Yields of
this magnitude assume further innovation and increasing
petrochemical inputs, and may not be technically feasible
(Cassman et al. 2003). However, regionally, a continuation
of recent trends that include vast disparities of access to
food will probably expose hundreds of millions more
people to chronic food insecurity, even if increasing cereal
demands as a result of biofuels and increased consumption
are ignored.
With a 2030 population of about 2.1 billion, Southern
Asia will face substantial food availability challenges. Our
2030 projections suggest a per capita cereal production of
193 kg per person per year (Table 4). This value is slightly
greater than our arbitrary subsistence threshold of 190 but
substantially (38%) less than the 2007 value of 231. Hence,
while our theoretical ‘food balance’ suggests sufficiency,
real conditions will probably result in chronic food short-
ages for large segments of this diverse region who have
negligible purchasing power. By 2050, our theoretical food
balance (Eq. 5) suggests that regional cereal production
might be adequate for only 90% of the population, leaving
a shortfall equivalent to the amount required by 373 million
people. Substantial water scarcity intensified by anthropo-
genic increases in air temperature and evaporation (Parry et
al. 2007) will further hamper agricultural expansion.
Central Asia appears likely to face challenges4 similar to
those of Southern Asia.
Eastern and Western Africa, where cereal crops provide
the majority of calories, will face substantial and increasing
food security challenges. Per capita cereal production in
Eastern Africa may decrease from a low 131 kg per person
per year in 2007 to a very low 84 kg per person per year in
2030. This decline almost triples the theoretical food
Table 4 Global and regional projections of per capita cereal
production (Eq. 1) and theoretical food balance (Eq. 5) statistics.
These values were based on 2030 estimates of yields and per capita
harvested area. Overall, and on average for the world, there will be
48 kg less of cereal production per person per year in 2030, a 14%
reduction over the 354 kg per person produced in 2007
2030 per capita cereal productiona Change in annual per capita production (2030–2007) 2030 food balance
Units [kg person−1] [kg person−1]b [%]c [Millions]d
World 306 −48 −14 4,833
Eastern Africa 84 −47 −36 −277
Middle Africa 38 −24 −38 −166
Northern Africa 180 −10 −5 −18
Southern Africa 189 8 4 −1
Western Africa 166 −23 −12 −61
N. America 1,236 −138 −10 2,168
Cent. America 199 −44 −18 6
Caribbean 47 −4 −9 −34
South America 273 −76 −22 203
Eastern Asia 276 −37 −12 716
Southern Asia 193 −38 −17 5
S-Eastern Asia 356 −12 −3 594
Western Asia 160 −44 −22 −54
Eastern Europe 542 −64 −11 468
N. Europe 618 146 31 227
S. Europe 396 −20 −5 145
W. Europe 771 176 30 569
Oceania 1,158 484 72 213
a 2030 yields and per capita harvested area were estimated based on 1960–2007 trends (Eqs. 2, 3, 4 and 5), and used to derive estimates of 2030
per capita cereal production (Eq. 1)
b The difference, in kilograms per person, between projected 2030 and observed 2007 per capita cereal production
c The difference, expressed as a percentage change, between projected 2030 and observed 2007 per capita cereal production
d Theoretical food balance (Eq. 2) for 2030, expressed in millions of people, based on an annual cereal requirement of 190 kg person−1 year−1
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imbalance from -96 million in 2007 to -277 million people in
2030. This corresponds to 32% of the total population in
2007 and 56% of the population in 2030. Western Africa
faces a similar, albeit more modest, decline in per capita
production (from 189 to 166 kg per person per year). Our
theoretical food balance suggests that this could expose
about 61 million people, or 14% of the population to chronic
food shortages.
This analysis suggests that Africa and Asia will experi-
ence continuing decreases in food availability and security.
Rapidly growing populations and increasing temperature will
place further demands on scarce water supplies. Biofuels and
rising demand by the global middle class will probably
compete for global production, raising prices and reducing
food access for rural and urban poor. Eighty-eight percent of
the 2007–2030 population growth will occur in African and
Asian countries which will be strongly influenced climati-
cally by the rapidly warming Indian and Pacific tropical
Oceans (Funk et al. 2008; Brown and Funk 2008).
Climate change analysis
Potential climate changes in the IO and PC1 climate
indicators
What do global climate change models tell us about 21st
century rainfall? The models (Table 2), on average, suggest
increases in tropical rainfall over the Indian Ocean and
tropical Pacific Ocean (Fig. 4). In these regions with very
warm surface waters, there is a clear relationship between
SSTs and tropical atmospheric dynamics. Future warming of
the oceans appears likely to increase rainfall over the tropical
Indian and Pacific basins. This increased oceanic rainfall will
release large amounts of energy into the atmosphere,
impacting global and regional circulations. These impacts
may be quantified using the 21st century climate change
simulations to calculate the PC1 and IO climate indicators
(see Section Climate change rainfall projections).
In general, the areas with increasing precipitation (blue
areas in Fig. 4) correspond to the geographic footprint of
both PC1 and IO, and the models examined suggest that
both PC1 and IO will increase by 2050 (Fig. 5). The global
(PC1) response, which corresponds strongly to warming in
the central Pacific, appears to increase in all quarters. The
IO warming appears much greater during March-April-May
(MAM) and December-January-February (DJF) than June-
July-August (JJA) or September-October-November
(SON). However, there is an inherent uncertainty in all
these projections due to differences in model formulations,
natural 10-year variations in the climate and the imperfect
simulations of key processes, such as El Niño. To quantify
this uncertainty the differences between the simulations can
be examined and the 68% confidence intervals obtained
from these differences evaluated (Fig. 5). In summary, the
models appear to agree on substantial increases in the PC1
and IO indicators, implying associated changes in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans circulations, but there is still a
high level of uncertainty as to the size of the changes.
When using climate change simulations, it is important
to realize how poorly the models used in the IPCC
assessments represent rainfall over land. The average
seasonal correlation between 1980–2000 observed and
modeled rainfall was examined (Fig. 6a). Each grid box
shows the correlation for the quarters (DJF, MAM, JJA,
SON) with the highest mean rainfall. Multi-model ensem-
ble estimates were made for each model, the correlations
estimated, and then averaged across the models. In general,
areas over the tropical oceans fit well with the climate
models and have good correlations. Brown boxes denote
areas where the IPCC models tend to perform very poorly,
with correlations of less than 0.3. Dark green areas are
reasonably skillful (R>0.6). In the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, these areas also tend to be areas with substantial
increases in rainfall predicted (Fig. 4). However, over
almost all land areas these evaluations suggest very small
correlation coefficients. This low level of skill makes
analysis of simulations of ‘raw’ climate change rainfall
problematic. Since the IPCC models tend to perform poorly
over land and reasonably well over the oceans, this study
adopted an alternative approach, based on hybrid-dynamic-
statistical reformulations.
Fig. 3 Time-series of per capita cereal production for the world,
Eastern Africa, Southern Asia, Eastern Asia, and Central America.
Values beyond 2007 are projections
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Hybrid dynamic-statistical reformulations of 21st century
climate change simulations
Hybrid dynamic-statistical reformulations (Funk et al.
2008; Brown and Funk 2008) provide one potential way
to overcome the limitations of global climate models.
Instead of using the climate model precipitation directly,
this analysis uses regression (based on historical data) to
relate changes at some location to large scale climate
indicators (such as PC1 or IO, Fig. 5). This is especially
useful when there is good evidence linking changes in
tropical oceanic rainfall and SSTs to terrestrial rainfall (e.g.
Funk et al. 2008). Precipitation reformulations (Brown and
Funk 2008), based on the 1st and 2nd principal components
of global precipitation (Fig. 6b) suggest that substantial
rainfall declines may occur over Central America, northern
South America, Africa, and parts of Southern Asia, and
Australia.
For more detailed spatial analysis, regressions between
African rainfall and PC1 and IO time-series may be used to
Fig. 4 Predicted precipitation
changes for the 21st century,
based on a large set of climate
change scenarios (See Table 2).
The outputs from these simula-
tions were averaged for each
quarter (March-April-May: A,
June-July-August: B,
September-October-November:
C, December-January-February:
D). Trends for the time period
2000–2100 were then calculated
and plotted. The model simula-
tion shows substantial increases
in rainfall over the oceans
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downscale anticipated 21st century shifts in these climate
forcings (Fig. 7). The season with the highest mean rainfall
was selected (Fig. 7a). Regression equations linking PC1
and IO to the local rainfall were then estimated. For most
areas, these models explained 40–70% of the variance. For
parts of sub-tropical Eastern Africa and Southern Africa
near the Indian Ocean, increasing IO and PC1 values are
associated with increasing aridity, warm anomalies in the
south-central Indian Ocean and moderate-to-strong El Nino
Southern Oscillation (ENSO), typically associated with
below normal MAM or DJF rainfall (Fig. 7b). These
historical relationships, combined with projected increases
in the IO and PC1 indicators (Fig. 5), suggest continued
declines in rainfall across southern Ethiopia, Somalia,
Kenya, northern Tanzania, southern Mozambique and
southern Zimbabwe. While considerable uncertainty
remains, it appears plausible, and even likely, that portions
of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia and
southern Ethiopia may experience greenhouse gas induced
rainfall reductions over the next 40 years. Therefore, if
warming of the Pacific and Indian Ocean continues, as
suggested by climate change models (Fig. 4), anthropogen-
ic drought appears likely to impact one of the most food
insecure regions of the world.
Our conclusions are generally in agreement with the
most recent 4th IPCC finding that semiarid Africa may
experience large-scale water stress and yield reductions by
2020 (Solomon et al. 2007). Our work, however, avoids the
direct use of terrestrial precipitation simulations due to their
low accuracy (Fig. 6a). Focusing on downscalings (Fig. 7)
of climate forcing diagnostics (Fig. 5), however, suggests
further drying, especially for Eastern Africa, where the
IPCC report (Solomon et al. 2007) suggests that precipita-
tion will increase. Future expansion of this work into Asia
could help confirm the potential decline in the Asian
monsoon suggested by our global reformulations (Fig. 6b).
Detailed African food security analysis
In Africa, the trends determining food security are complex.
Selected agricultural, food aid and population statistics for
18 semiarid food insecure countries in Western Africa,
Eastern Africa and the eastern part of Southern Africa
(Table 5) include combined data for Ethiopia and Eritrea as
they were united before 1993. Geographic variations
between these three regions play a strong role in their level
of agricultural self-sufficiency. In 2005, the Western
African countries had, on average, three times as much
harvested area as Eastern Africa (0.26 versus 0.08 ha
person−1). Per capita harvested areas for southeastern
portions of Southern Africa are only slightly higher than
those for Eastern Africa (0.10 ha per person−1). There are
also considerable differences in per capita harvested area
between the countries in each of these regions.
For these countries, harvested area largely determines
national cereal production totals.6 Over the period 2001–
2005, the relatively food secure Sahelian countries 7 have per
7 Sparsely populated Mauritania and groundnut-dependent Senegal are
not well modeled in this analysis structure.
6 R2=0.96 for 1979–2005 mean area vs. production totals for these 18
countries.
Fig. 5 Summary of changes in
precipitation predicted for
2050: global (PC1, x-axis) and
Indian Ocean (IO, y-axis).
All indicator time series have
been standardized, with an
expected mean of zero
and standard deviation (σ)
of 1. Thus a change of +1 would
indicate a shift in the mean
value equivalent to a standard
deviation of 1. The figure gives
the anticipated seasonal 2050
change for a given quarter
(March-April-May [MAM],
December-January-February
[DJF], June-July-August [JJA)]
and September-October-
November [SON]. The inter-
model variation of the climate
models is shown using lines
indicating the 68% confidence
interval
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capita agricultural capacity values (h, Eq. 8) above 190 kg
person−1 year−1. Over the same period, the southeastern
Africa and Greater Horn countries had agricultural capacity
values of 122 and 99 kg person−1 year−1, respectively. Seed
and fertilizer inputs were limited. In 2005, fertilizer inputs
were typically below 20 kg ha−1 in these low productivity
zones.
Low yield growth combined with declining per capita
harvested area has led to decreases in per capita agricultural
capacity (Table 5). Because of increases in population,
these food insecure countries in Eastern, Southern and
Western Africa have experienced, respectively, 18, 22, and
28% reductions in per capita harvested area between 1979
and 2005. Between 1979 and 2005, fertilizer increased in
the Sahel and Greater Horn and declined in eastern
Southern Africa. Of the four main users of fertilizer in
2005, Kenya had increased its fertilizer use from 21 to
67 kg ha−1. Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland saw
substantial reductions from the early 1980s.
In these semiarid countries, a strong dependence on rain-
fed smallholder farming practices results in quasi-linear
relationships between seasonal rainfall, grain yields, and
food deficits. Hence, the agricultural capacity multiplied by
rainfall (Eq. 7) is strongly related to per capita production.
The inverse of this measure (food imbalance) is related to
food aid. For each country, the food imbalance measure
was regressed against 1979–2005 WFP humanitarian
assistance. This gives a pragmatic means of translating
changes in rainfall, cropped area, seed use and fertilizer use
into an index of potential food aid requirements, supported
empirically by historical aid figures. Due to the low per
capita production, the resulting model performed well at a
regional scale for Eastern and Southern Africa (r=0.86, p=
1.6×10−5) but was less accurate for the Western African
countries (r=0.48, p=4.8×10−2). Agricultural sufficiency
may also be expressed as a theoretical food balance, based
on an assumed annual cereals requirement of 190 kg per
capita. Changes in the theoretical food balance (Eq. 5)
Fig. 6 The average correlation between the observed and modeled
rainfall during the main rainfall season (a). These seasons are shown
with letters, D denotes DJF, M = MAM, J = JJA, S = SON. The
ensemble correlation, was estimated by calculating the correlation for
each 20th century model simulation listed in Table 2 and then
averaging. The yellow and brown boxes are areas in which the
modeled rainfall is very inaccurate. The bottom panel (b) shows our
estimates of 2050 rainfall changes (ΔP). These are changes in the
main rainy season expressed in standard deviations and are based on
the first two principal components of modeled 21st century rainfall,
assuming a universal CO2 doubling scenario. The light/dark brown
boxes show a modest/considerable reduction in mean rainfall. Results
in b reprinted from Brown & Funk (2008), with the permission of
AAAS
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agree strongly with changes in WFP food aid,8 explaining
70% and 85% of their variance at national and regional
scales.
Combining observed 1994–2003 agricultural capacity
trends with our projected rainfall tendencies, this model can
be used to project 2000 to 2030 food aid requirements
(Fig. 8). We show historical WFP aid figures, historical
model aid figures, and results from four sets of aid
projection scenarios. The first scenario assumes that recent
trends in population, rainfall, crop area, seed use, and
fertilizer use continue for the next 30 years. The second
scenario is the same, but with the change in rainfall inferred
from our 1950–2005 Indian Ocean regressions and 21st
century climate simulations. The third scenario assumes
that precipitation levels will remain similar to those
observed today. The fourth is an ‘agricultural growth’
scenario, in which observed rainfall trends continue, but per
capita food availability is assumed to increase by 2 kg per
person per year.
These results suggest that the interaction between
drought and declining agricultural capacity (which includes
population growth) may be explosive, dangerous and
costly, with annual aid totals increasing by 83% by 2030.
The ‘observed’ versus ‘projected’ trends differ primarily for
the Sahel (Fig. 8). The impact of climate change on the
Sahel is keenly debated, and our analysis explicitly ignores
influences from the Atlantic Ocean. Current agricultural
capacity and rainfall trends will probably produce a 60%
increase in food aid expenditures in the next two decades,
and will probably lead to a 43% increase in food insecurity
in Africa. These figures are significant because food aid is
an indicator of many related problems including child
malnutrition, as well as declines in health, productivity and
economic growth (FAO, 2007). Including limitations in
growth of harvested area and the impacts of increased
growing season temperatures and potential evapotranspira-
tion would inflate all these aid projections. Two hundred
million sub-Saharan Africans were undernourished in 2002,
and if the observed 1982–2002 trend continues this total
may increase to almost 600 million people by 2030.
World yield analyses
A set of projected agricultural yield values for the FAO
regions (Fig. 9a) are those based on 1961–2007 linear trend
models. Annual yield trends vary significantly by region.
North America, Western Europe, and Eastern Asia have
seen increases of over 700 kg ha−1 annum−1. Projections
(Fig. 9a) for some of these regions in 2030 reach beyond
7,000 kg ha−1. These projected yields may be beyond
practical limits (Cassman et al. 2003). Western, Middle, and
Eastern Africa, conversely, have exhibited very slow
growth in yields (Table 5), with annual changes in yields
of less than 110 kg ha−1 annum−1. Without accelerated
agricultural development, 2030 yields will still be very low
(Fig. 9a) The anticipated 2007 to 2030 transition in per
capita production [kg person−1 annum−1] has the 2007
value in kg per person per year to the left of the arrow and
the 2030 prediction to the right.
Substantial reductions appear likely for Southern and
Central America, Western and Eastern Africa, and Southern
and Eastern Asia. Middle Africa and central Asia may
Fig. 7 Main growing quarters
(left panel: MAM, JJA, SON,
DJF) and rainfall projections,
expressed as % change for 2050
for these quarters (right panel)
as described by the hybrid
dynamic-statistical precipitation
reformulations for eastern and
southern Africa. They are based
on 21st century projections of
central Indian Ocean [0–15°S,
60–90°E] precipitation and
global precipitation 1st principal
components (IO and PC1, re-
spectively). Changes in rainfall
were obtained by multiplying
the IO and PC1 regression
parameters by the seasonally
appropriate changes shown in
Fig. 5
8 We admit to a certain circularity of argument here. FAO food
balance calculations have been used to guide WFP aid distributions,
helping to enforce a tautological relationship. The data we choose to
collect often follows closely our pre-existing observations, and tend to
follow our theoretical paradigms (Kuhn 1962).
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exhibit similar tendencies but were not modeled due to data
limitations. Projected 2030 yields in Central America,
Western and Eastern Africa, and Southern Asia remain
below 4,000 kg ha−1 annum−1.These two scenarios contrast
‘business as usual’ outcomes with plausible agricultural
growth patterns. In the former, future yield trends are
assumed to be the same as 1961–2007 yield trends (Table 3).
In the latter scenario, we set baseline per capita cereal
production targets and solve for the necessary yields in 2030.
The ‘business as usual’ projected yields analysis (Fig. 9a)
displays three key characteristics: i) yield trends and 2030
yield outcomes vary dramatically by region, ii) in developed
nations a continuance of observed yield trends may result in
physically unrealistic results, and iii) in Africa, Central
America and Southern Asia, a continuance of current trends
will result in very low levels of food availability. Given
increasing globalization and technological limits, one might
imagine that yields would have converged since 1960. This
has not been the case; rather the green revolution has
followed a course in which the ‘green get greener’, with
growth then slowing above 5,000 kg per ha per year. Yields
in 1961 have been a very good predictor of yields in 2007
(R2=0.8.6); countries with lower yields have tended to
increase their yields more slowly. This has enhanced differ-
ences between nations. In 1961 the highest regional yields
were four times the lowest. This ratio rose to nine in 2007. A
continuance of these trends will increase this ratio to 11 by
2030. As yield growth lags and per capita harvested areas
decline, per capita cereal production will reach dangerous
levels in Africa, Central America and Southern Asia.
As an alternative to using observed yield trends from
Table 3, we can specify a target 2030 per capita production
and solve directly for the required yield (Fig. 9b). This
approach uses trends in per capita harvested area but then
estimates 2030 yields algebraically. Two sets of cereal
production targets were used. A minimal threshold of
190 kg ha−1 annum−1 was specified for African nations.
The other countries were set to their 2007 values. This
represents a modest ‘agricultural growth’ scenario, in which
per capita production for most of the world maintains parity
with current levels and Africa experiences modest gains.
This exercise suggests two salient results. First, the
target yield gains for Africa appear small in magnitude but
large in ratio. Looking at Eastern Africa, for example, we
see that a transition from yields of 1,482 kg per hectare per
year (Table 3) to 3,500 kg per hectare per year (Fig. 9b)
would make the region relatively food secure. This is a
large percent increase, but not technically impossible–
farming efficiencies would have to approach those used in
Southern America in 2007 (Fig. 9a).
A second feature of Fig. 9b is that maintaining current
per capita cereal production levels in Northern America and
Eastern Asia will require substantial increases in yields,
much greater than those anticipated by historical trends. As
per capita harvested area diminishes rapidly in these
regions, very large increases in yields will be required to
produce enough cereal to feed the future population at its
current level of per capita cereal consumption. For Eastern
Asia to maintain a per capita cereal production of 314 kg
per person per year, yields will need to increase from their
2007 level of 5,418 kg per hectare per year (Table 3) to a
very high yield of 8,600 kg per hectare per year. This may
not be technically feasible or environmentally sustainable.
Although there is a substantial gap between maximum
theoretical yield for the major world crops of maize, rice,
and wheat and actual average yields, in recent years the
gains in yields have declined. Rice yields in China and
Fig. 8 Results from the modeling of the food balance indicator for the
Sahel, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa. The black bars show
historic WFP food aid, accumulated over 13 year intervals. The grey
bars show empirical food aid estimates based on regressions with
historic agricultural capacity and rainfall (cf. Eq. 7). The next set of
bars show food aid projections based on four different assumptions of
future scenarios. The light brown, dark brown, and yellow bars use
historic agricultural capacity trends (cf. Eq. 8) combined with rainfall
assumed to either i) trend along observed patterns, ii) trend according
to rainfall predicted from Indian Ocean precipitation, or iii) to have no
trend at all. The green bars show a scenario based on observed rainfall
trends and an agricultural growth scenario
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Indonesia and wheat yields in India and France, for
example, have not increased substantially in the past decade
(Cassman et al. 2003). Increasing yields beyond levels
attained in these countries will require either enormous
investments in freshwater irrigation systems or a transfor-
mation of the agricultural systems to incorporate new
technological advances, both of which are highly unlikely
in the next few decades. Investing in regions with
extremely low agricultural productive capacity, therefore,
will be a much less expensive way to improve global
agricultural production. Bringing maize yields from 700 to
5,000 kg per hectare is far easier than increasing yields
from 7,000 kg per hectare to 8,000 kg per hectare (Naylor
1996). This observation turns the standard food security
Fig. 9 Projected yields for 2030 (a) based on historical 1961–2007
trends (cf. Table 3). Values shown before and after arrows denote,
respectively, the observed 2007 and projected 2030 per capita cereal
production values in kg per person per year. Targeted yields (b)
assuming the 2030 per capita production values on the right hand
sides of the arrows
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paradigm on its head. With lower population growth and
more effective farming practices, by 2030 it could be an
agriculturally active Africa that helps alleviate global
shortages of cereal production.
Conclusions
This paper has presented analyses which show that without
concerted effort, today’s food security crisis will continue to
accelerate, robbing millions of people of their potential
livelihoods. Food security and agricultural production are not
directly linked. Politics, economics and access are also
critical issues. In countries that experience significant levels
of hunger, however, productive capacity is an important
constraint, made more salient by increasing food price
volatility. Investment in further productive capacity in
regions with growing populations remains a challenge. Our
results suggest that large-scale trends in yields and per capita
harvested area (Fig. 2) are very predictable. It appears quite
certain that the world will experience significant reductions
in food availability as consumption demands increase due to
biofuels and rising living standards.
Some parts of the developing world, such as Southern
Asia, may have per capita production levels in 2030 similar
to those of the 1960s or 1970s (Fig. 3). Other regions, such
as Eastern Africa, face burgeoning food crises if current
trends persist (Fig. 9). Greenhouse gas induced warming in
the tropical Indian Ocean (Funk et al. 2008) and Pacific
Ocean (Brown and Funk 2008) could exacerbate the
likelihood of drought across many food producing regions
(Figs. 6 and 7). Anthropogenic drought appears quite likely
to affect chronically insecure Eastern Africa. Our food
balance modeling (Fig. 8), however, suggests that agricul-
tural development is likely to be a reasonable and effective
mitigation strategy. The alternative may be a continued and
expensive increase in chronic food aid.
Less certain but plausible climate change impacts on
Southern Asia could also threaten agricultural production.
Anthropogenic drought in Southern Asia (Fig. 6b), com-
bined with declining per capita harvested areas, could lead
to an explosive decrease in cereal availability, below the
return to 1970 levels anticipated by our trend analysis
(Fig. 3). Given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding
all 21st century rainfall projections, and the strong links
between these predictions and global food security, there
will be a very strong economic and social value associated
with more accurate and reliable regional rainfall predic-
tions. Expanded support for precipitation modeling, espe-
cially in areas with mountainous terrain, could help address
the emerging food crises of the next 30 years. This research
could improve seasonal forecasts while better informing the
IPCC assessments.
Many trends affect agricultural sustainability. It is
important to recognize the complexity and interaction of
these different factors. At the farm level, land modifica-
tions, plot landscape positioning, alternative crops or
varieties, in-soil vegetative material and well-placed biodi-
versity can all play a role in countering unfavorable
climatic events. Degradation in soil quality and in the
overall natural resource base may threaten the long-run
viability of several of the world’s most intensive agricul-
tural systems. Combined with monocultures of improved
crops supported through high levels of inputs, much can be
done to increase agricultural productivity in regions that
currently produce 10% or less of their theoretical potential
(Brown and Funk 2008). Agricultural innovations require
political and economic stability, investment, and societal
learning that must be sustained over relatively long
periods. Some places in the developing world have
managed to capitalize on new techniques and technology
to significantly increase production, such as in Kenya’s
main maize growing districts where maize yields have
increased from 3,000 to 5,000 kg per hectare in the past
8 years.9 These gains are threatened when national
political crises cut off roads, restrict access to critical
inputs, and cause uncertainty in export contracts. The
context in which production occurs is just as important as
production itself.
Economic growth, improved food security, and wide-
scale poverty reduction all require productivity gains in
agriculture (Haggblade 2007). Agriculture serves as a
powerful engine of poverty reduction, one which can bring
the poorest a rapid improvement in income through direct
technology transfer. According to Michael Lipton, “no
country has achieved mass dollar poverty reduction without
prior investment in agriculture” (Lipton 2005). Available
evidence suggests that investment in public goods such as
agricultural research, agricultural extension, and road net-
works constitutes one of the most effective tools available
for stimulating economic growth and poverty reduction.
Increasing per capita agricultural production in regions that
currently have very low yields can be achieved with
investment in these public goods (Platteau 1996, Lamb
2000). These investments can result in significant gains in
incomes and reduction in poverty, which will reduce the
number of people chronically malnourished.
Improved economic development, aid and agricultural
policies, backed by adequate resources, can prevent
humanitarian crises. Improved agricultural capacity is one
of many reasonable ways to reduce vulnerability within
Africa. Improved seed and fertilizer distribution can
enhance yields, as can better land tenure and management
9 Personal communication, Curt Reynolds, August 2008.
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policies. Expensive and potentially disruptive food aid
shipments are much smaller than domestic African crop
production. Since local cereal production is 100 times
greater than food aid totals, modest increases in African
food production could eradicate food production shortfalls.
Our food balance modeling (Fig. 8), suggests that modest
increases in yield would help eliminate the need for most
external shipments of food aid.
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